In this series of five short articles, we show how the CRA has publicly scaled back its growth ambitions for the CVITP.  We cover four distinct periods in the evolution of the CVITP over the last 10 years:

• During the 2013-2017 period, the CVITP saw steady growth but this does not appear to be because of any explicit strategy.
• In the 2018-2019 period, aided by the quadrupling of the budget to support its administration of this program, the CRA established its first performance targets for the CVITP.  These targets would cover the 2018 to 2021 tax seasons.  The CRA planned to achieve these targets without providing the community-based organizations and their volunteers who delivered this service any financial support.
• The 2020-2021 period saw a collapse in CVITP services followed by a modest rebound.  This was due to the introduction of COVID-related public health restrictions which restricted in-person clinics, the main delivery model which had been used up to that point in time.
• Given that the CVITP’s performance was well short of the targets established by the CRA, the Agency eliminated any further targeting or performance reporting to Parliament on the CVITP for the 2022-2024 period.  It also introduced a pilot grant program to provide modest support to community-based organizations hosting the CVITP during the 2021, 2022 and 2023 tax seasons.  The intent of the program is to provide a financial incentive for existing host organizations to take on more clients and new community-based programs to host CVITP services.  However, this period also coincides with the return to normalcy in public life.  Thus, we should expect the CVITP to recover some of the ground it lost in 2020 even in the absence of financial incentives.

Given the history of CRA’s changing ambitions for the CVITP, we draw three conclusions:

1. The CRA’s track record in performance targeting with the CVITP illustrates how meaningless it is for federal departments and agencies to set, monitor and report on their own results.  When performance falls short of targets, these can be changed or dropped entirely to avoid the inconvenience of having to explain awkward results.  The elimination of any further performance indicator for the CVITP suggests the CRA no longer considers that the CVITP is part of its key responsibilities.
2. CRA data for the 2022 tax season, the most recent available, show the CVITP’s numbers of returns completed and of individuals assisted represent about three quarters of the results achieved in the 2019 tax season.  Worse still, the number of returns completed is only a 13% increase over the number produced for the 2013 tax season (the earliest figure reported by the CRA).  And the number of individuals assisted is only about 80% of the number for the 2016 tax season (the earliest figure reported by the CRA).  Yet, over the same period, the Canadian population has grown and the federal government has increasingly resorted to using the return filing process as its principal tool for allocating a growing number of income-tested benefits.  It is unclear how, despite a quadrupling of its CVITP budget, the CRA has managed to produce such poor results.
3. The fact that the CRA has quietly abandoned its growth ambitions for the CVITP calls into question the federal government’s statement in its 2018 Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) that the CVITP is a key program for helping to deliver on the PRS objectives.  If the PRS is genuinely a strategy and not just a communications tool, the federal government needs to follow up and ensure that the relevant departments and agencies it depends on to achieve the PRS objectives are implementing their initiatives effectively.  Someone senior inside the federal government needs to be calling the CRA to account for its poor implementation of the CVITP.